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Professor Delgado's "Brainwashing"
Defense: Courting A Determinist Legal
System
Joshua Dressler*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1951, journalist Edward Hunter wrote a book describing
"brainwashing,"' a process of abrupt attitudinal change that was
used in the People's Republic of China.2 At that time, the United
States was involved in a "hot" war with the Communist government
of North Korea and a "cold" war with the ideology of Marxism. This
situation caused both the unfamiliar term and the concept underlying it-that people can have their life-long values involuntarily and
suddenly changed-to become the subjects of widespread general interest and copious scientific literature. 3 Except for some interest engendered by military court-martial proceedings against American
prisoners of war,4 however, brainwashing was largely ignored in legal
circles until recently, when kidnapping victim Patricia Hearst was
prosecuted for joining her captors in a bank robbery. 5
The absence of debate within the legal community is unfortunate, because the subject of coercive persuasion raises more than eso* Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. The author
wishes to acknowledge Ms. Linda Aaker for her assistance and advice, Mr. Douglas
Duncan for his research, and Professor Richard Delgado for his ready cooperation
in-even encouragement of-the preparation of this rejoinder to his excellent article.
1. The term "brainwashing" will generally not be used in this Article because it
has been criticized by scientists as inaccurate and overly identified with antiCommunist hysteria. See, e.g., R. LIrtON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
TOTALISM

3-4 (1961); E.

SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION

18 (1961). Instead, the term

"coercive persuasion," originated by Schein: will be used to describe both the "thought
reform" processes used by the Chinese and described in much of the scientific literature, and all other forms of alleged attitudinal and behavioral indoctrination, whether
initiated by religious cultists, television, or any other source.
2. E. HUNTER, BRAINWASHING IN RED CHINA (1951).
3. Much of the literature written prior to 1961 is summarized and discussed in
E. SCHEIN, supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 46 (A.C.M.R. 1955), affl'd, 7
C.M.A. 460, 22 C.M.R. 250 (1957); United States v. Batchelor, 19 C.M.R. 452
(A.C.M.R. 1954), affd, 7 C.M.A. 354, 22 C.M.R. 144 (1956); United States v. Fleming,
19 C.M.R. 438 (A.C.M.R. 1954), affl'd, 7 C.M.A. 543, 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957); United States
v. Dickenson, 17 C.M.R. 438 (A.C.M.R. 1954), aff'd, 6 C.M.A. 438, 20 C.M.R. 154
(1955).
5. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975); United States
v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978); THE TRIAL OF PA 'Y HEARsT (1976) (trial transcript).
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teric scientific questions. Its consideration leads to fundamental philosophical quandaries concerning the continued viability of the concept of free will, one of the basic premises of our substantive criminal
justice system.
Nor can it any longer be said that the issue of coercive persuasion, and the related debate regarding free will, are of mere academic
interest. The likelihood that a defense based on coercive persuasion
will be raised in the future is great. ProsecutioA following "terrorist"
kidnapping is but one situation raising the issue. Another is in
connection with certain religious cults that allegedly not only coercively indoctrinate new members to their religious views but also
indoctrinate them to commit fraudulent acts.' In response to the
conversion techniques adopted by the cults, parents and professional
deprogrammers have imprisoned cultists in order to reverse this influence. The propriety of both the original coercive persuasion and subsequent deprogramming has already been litigated in criminal cases,7
actions in intentional tort,8 civil rights actions,' and competency'"
and conservatorship" hearings. Arguments based loosely on coercive
persuasion have also been made in trials that did not involve cultists. ' ,
6. See, e.g., Adler, Rescuing David from the Moonies, EsQuiRE, June 6, 1978, at
23, 30; Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle PersuasionUnder the First
Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 32 (1977); Nordheimer, Guyanese Comb Jungles
Fruitlesslyfor Sect's Suicide Rite, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1978, at 1, col. 2.
7. E.g., United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976) (acquittal); People
v. Florence, No. 8699 (Mun. Ct., Fullerton, Cal. May 6, 1965) (conviction).
8. E.g., Leal v. Trauscht, No. 484579-9 (Super. Ct., Alameda Cty. Cal., Aug. 20,
1976) (false imprisonment action).
9. E.g., Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (adult cultist sued
parents).
10. E.g., Schuppin v. Unification Church, 435 F. Supp. 603 (D. Vt.), aff'd mem.,
573 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1977) (parents sued religious organization; contended child
incompetent).
11. E.g., Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977)
(conservatorship sought for purposes of deprogramming).
12. See, e.g., LaRouche v. City of New York, 369 F. Supp. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(civil rights action against C.I.A. and others; brainwashing persons to assassinate
radicals); Niemi v. National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978) (minor's suit against broadcasting company;
allegation that juveniles that injured her acted upon stimulus of television drama);
People v. Manson, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1977), cert. denied sub nom.
Manson v. California, 435 U.S. 953 (1978); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132
Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Manson v. California, 430 U.S. 986 (1977)
(murder trial; form of "hypnosis" used by Manson on followers); Zamora v. State, 361
So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1978) (murder defendant claimed "intoxicated" by watching television
show Kojak); Thompson v. Thompson, 237 Ga. 509, 228 S.E.2d 886 (1976) (divorce
action allegation by wife; husband, expert in "brainwashing," used such techniques
on her).
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It is critical, then, for both practical and jurisprudential reasons,
that legal scholarship in this field flourish. Three recent articles addressing the question of coercive persuasion as a criminal defense
have initiated this process, but more is needed. Unfortunately, two
of the articles rejected in relatively perfunctory fashion the idea that
the law should permit this new defense.' 3 An article written by Professor Richard Delgado," however, presents for the first time in legal
literature a lucid rationalization for such a new claim.
Because Professor Delgado is the first to call for such a defense,
and because he states a convincing case for it, it is to his analysis that
this Article directly responds. It is the thesis of this author that
Delgado erroneously applies certain criminal law doctrines. More significantly, this Article attempts to show that Delgado's stated defense, or indeed any similar defense, must by necessity either go too
far or not far enough. That is, it is logically impossible to frame a
coercive persuasion defense that is both consistent with present criminal law and jurisprudential doctrines and is also morally acceptable.
Either we reject such a defense, or we revolutionize the criminal law.' 5
II.

DELGADO'S THESIS

Professor Delgado sets for himself the goal of justifying a new
criminal defense theory for the coercively persuaded defendant which
is a "logical extension of existing concepts of act, intent, and blame"' 16
and which does not "fatally [erode] the [criminal law's] assumption of freedom of the will."' 7
Delgado premises his theory on a new criminal law doctrine he
variously describes as "transferred,""' "superimposed,' 9 or
"implanted" 0 mens rea. He readily concedes that the typical coer13. Lunde & Wilson, Brainwashing as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Patty
HearstRevisited, 13 CRuM. L. BULL. 341 (1977); Note, Brainwashing:Fact,Fictionand
Criminal Defense, 44 U. Mo. KAN. Crry L. REv. 438 (1976).
14. Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward a Defense Theory
for the Coercively Persuaded("Brainwashed")Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1978).
15. The present author is a philosophical determinist. He would therefore, probably, although not certainly, choose the path of revolutionizing the law. Nonetheless,
no attempt is made in this Article to justify or advocate such a position. The purpose
of this reply to Professor Delgado is more modest: to demonstrate that the question
Delgado asks-whether society should countenance a coercive persuasion defense-is
an incorrect inquiry. Instead, society must ask a more difficult question: whether to
reject entirely the premise of free will and the criminal law doctrines based on it, or
leave unchanged the current exculpatory concepts of the criminal law.
16. Delgado, supra note 14, at 10.
17. Id. at 33.
18. Id. at 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 28.
19. Id. at 11, 16.
20. Id. at 11, 20.
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cively persuaded defendant is neither insane, coerced, nor the victim
of diminished capacity when the criminal acts are performed. 2 In
addition, he grants that such a person acts consciously, even enthusiastically, fully aware of the wrongfulness of his actions." By all
traditional indices, the requisite mens rea is therefore present. Delgado nevertheless suggests that because such intent is coercively indoctrinated into the actor, "the guilty mind with which he acts is not
his own,"" and should instead be ascribed solely to the captor. In
light of the criminal law's "insistence that any requisite mental state
be found to be that of the defendant himself,""4 Delgado asserts, the
defendant should be exculpated and the captor prosecuted.
Delgado reinforces this doctrinal position with penological arguments, attempting to demonstrate that no modem theory of punishment warrants conviction. He adopts, first, what he admits is an
unprovable moral premise: "[P]ersons who have without fault undergone brutalizing experiences aimed at effecting drastic changes in
their thoughts and behavior should not be held accountable for actions stemming from these experiences ....
", From this, Delgado
concludes that the coercively persuaded defendant is morally blameless for his actions. Consequently, he finds the retributive basis of
punishment inapplicable.
In addition, he contends that utilitarian 6 theories of punishment
justify acquittal when a victim of coercive persuasion commits an
otherwise criminal act. First, he asserts that most such people upon
release return to their earlier law-abiding views;27 theories of rehabilitation and special deterrence2 are therefore inapplicable. Second,
although the theory of general deterrence 2 could be used to support
punishment, the law does not ordinarily permit utilitarian-based
punishment unless the individual is also morally condemnable."' Del21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
the total
prevents

Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7 n.30.
Utilitarianism is based on the premise that the law's purpose is to increase
happiness of the community and to eliminate, insofar as is possible, all that
such happiness. See Bentham, Of The Principleof Utility, in AN INTRODUCnON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 12-13 (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.
1970). Accordingly, punishment of a person (an evil, because it prevents happiness) is
permissible only if it is outweighed by the societal happiness it causes.
27. Delgado, supra note 14, at 9.
28. Special deterrence involves the immediate deterrence of the actor by incapacitation, or the actor's later deterrence by the intimidation that results from incarceration. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39, 45-53 (1968).
29. General deterrence is punishment of an offender in order to discourage commission of proscribed conduct by others. See generally id. at 39.
30. It has been suggested that the utilitarian approach, followed to its logical
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gado insists, therefore, that since coercively persuaded actors are
morally blameless, general deterrence does not justify imposing criminal sanctions on them.
With the doctrinal and penological arguments made, Delgado
turns to the definition of his new defense. He admits that it is difficult to state its necessary and sufficient conditions, so he instead lists
factors to be considered in deciding whether to allow the defense:
a. The defendant's mental state results from unusual or abnormal influences ....
b. The induced mental state represents a sharp departure
from the individual's ordinary mode of thinking ...
c. The state is one that is imposed on the subject ....
d. The criminal acts benefit the captors ...
e. The actor, when apprised of the manner in which he came
to hold his beliefs, rejects them and sees them as inauthentic or
foreign ...
f. The actor evidences symptoms typical of the coercively persuaded personality. . . .3
When all or many of these factors are present, Delgado would32invoke
the defense. When few of them exist, he would not apply it.
Delgado expressly states that this defense would be available not
only when a defendant is coercively persuaded to commit specific
criminal acts, but also when indoctrination is solely attitudinal and
the defendant is "free to choose" how to act upon such beliefs. On
the other hand, his defense excludes by definition environmental,
media, and similar indoctrination.34
35
I. CRITICISM OF DELGADO'S THESIS

Professor Delgado presents a case that, on first view, is appealconclusion, could mandate long-term incarceration of a person who has committed no
crime, see generally McCloskey, An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66
PHOSOPmCAL REV. 466, 473-75 (1957), or only a trivial crime, S. RuBN, LAW OF CmrMINAL CORRECMON § 16, at 758 (1963). This result is prevented, however, since it is
generally agreed that before utilitarian goals are to be followed, an actor must be
morally blameworthy. See, e.g., H. PACKER, supra note 28, at 62. See also notes 39-43
infra and accompanying text.
31. Delgado, supra note 14, at 19-22 (emphasis omitted).
32. Id. at 22.
33. Id. at 29.
34. Factors (a.) and (f.) and often (d.) would exclude such situations. See id. at
19-22; text accompanying note 30 supra.
35. Throughout this section, two assumptions are made. First, it is assumed that

the actor, at the time of trial, rejects as immoral his earlier programmed views. This
is generally the case. See, e.g., R. LIFTON, supra note 1, at 236 (Chinese communist
thought reform rejected). If such is not the case, then Delgado's penological premises,
see notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text, are faulty; rehabilitation and specific
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ing. He provides a defense for people with whom he, and many others,
obviously sympathize." At the same time, he assures us that such a
result can be reached without radical changes in criminal law doctrine." Thus, reformers can appear humane while causing ripples, not
waves, in the criminal law system.
Unfortunately, a careful review of substantive criminal law and
current jurisprudential doctrine demonstrates that Delgado's claim is
not on solid ground. A fundamental premise of the criminal law, and
that which distinguishes the criminal sanction from the civil, is that
societal condemnation of the violator of societal norms, or at least of
his actions, is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition to punishing the offender. 8 The criminal sanction is applied only when the
actor is deserving of punishment. Delgado's defense, however, fails to
properly identify those people whom society currently believes are
blameworthy (deserving of condemnation) and those who are not.
Second, because he fails to frame a defense that has sufficiently clear
and just limits to make it susceptible of administration, his defense
necessitates embracing a determinist view of society.

A.

BLAMEWORTHINESS

In order to understand why Delgado has failed to satisfy the first
of these requirements-identifying people society views as blameworthy-it is necessary to examine the circumstances under which society finds an individual charged with criminal conduct to be either
blameworthy or blameless. In broad terms, a person is considered
deterrence are valid theories for incarcerating the coercively persuaded actor. Delgado
admits as much when he suggests that, as a "last resort" the "defense can simply be
denied in cases in which the victim has not spontaneously 'deconverted' prior to trial."
Delgado, supra note 14, at 32.
Second, it is assumed that the coercively persuaded actor does not suffer from a
disease of the mind as a result of the indoctrination, which would permit the defendant
to raise a traditional insanity defense. Such a person, however, may in fact display
psychotic or near-psychotic symptoms. See R. LirON, supra note 1, at 33; Delgado,
supra note 6, at 15. In such circumstances, insanity may be a valid defense. If the person has such a "disease" but the insanity test still fails, this may suggest that the
insanity defense should be enlarged. It does not, however, demonstrate the need for a
new defense.
36. See Delgado, supra note 14, at 7-8 n.31. It is perhaps worth speculating
whether such sympathy by some is due to the treatment such victims have received,
or is related more to the fact that victims of coercive persuasion are the "good
guys"-coed daughters of multimillionaires, American soldiers, and the children of the
middle class-while the fanatic "brainwashers" are the "bad guys"-Communists and
religious cultists.
37. Delgado, supra note 14, at 33.

38. See Hart, The Aims of The Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401,
404-05 (1958).
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blameworthy when he voluntarily commits an immoral 39 or illegal 0
act-actus reus 4'-while possessing the requisite "guilty" mental
state-mens rea.42 Under traditional doctrine, if either actus reus or
mens rea is absent, the individual is not deserving of punishment. 3
These concepts thus provide a means of identifying society's definition of blameworthiness. Additional insight into the blameworthiness
concept may be obtained by examining the traditional excuses of
insanity and duress.
1.

Mens Rea

The term "mens rea" can have either a loose or a strict meaning.
Used loosely, it is equivalent to "criminal legal responsibility." In
that sense, it means nothing more than that punishment is justified
for one who possesses mens rea, while for one lacking mens rea, it is
not." So viewed, all defenses involve the issue of mens rea. The term
has, however, a more precise meaning as well. Strictly used, mens rea
is the specific mental state required in the definition of an offense."
What must be proven in this sense of the term is that the defendant
intended46 to commit the prohibited acts or was aware of all the facts
that made the conduct criminal." Although the term mens rea as so
used has been translated by Blackstone to mean that the defendant
must have a "vicious will,"" it is not necessary that defendant be an
39.

H.M. HART, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 149 (1947).
H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 95, 104-05 (S. Hook ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited
as DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM].
41. See notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text.
42. See notes 44-54 infra and accompanying text.
43. See H. PACKER, supra note 28, at 105.
44. See id. at 106; Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRmGE L.J. 273,
274-75 (1968).
45. See M. BASSIoUNt, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 168 (1978); W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 27, at 192 (1972); H. PACKER, supra note 28, at
105; G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 31 (2d ed. 1961); Kadish supra note 44, at 274. See
generally Allard v. Selfridge, [1925] 1 K.B. 137.
46. "Intent" means only that the actor intended to do the acts that, according
to the law, are prohibited. Intent to violate the law is not necessary. See G. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING THE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2.1, at 397 (1978). The Model Penal Code defines
an "act" as "a bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary," MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), but requires that the act in question be
voluntary to incur criminal liability. Id. § 2.01(1). See also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT,
supra note 45, § 25, at 177-80.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Busic, No. 77-1332 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1978) (psychological defense of abnormal mental state rejected in airplane hijacking case; general
criminal intent sufficient); United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1941)
(awareness only requirement for mens rea; mens rea is criminal intent).
48. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21.

40.
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evil person."
Implicit in the concept of mens rea is the idea of choice, for an
actor cannot be said to have "intended" to commit an act if he had
no choice but to commit it. The existence of general human free will,
however, is conclusively presumed.50 Although the philosophical and
scientific arguments for determinism may seem persuasive to some,5'
the criminal justice system rejects, as a matter of policy, any doctrine
that conflicts with a free will theory.
The reason for this inflexible position is that if it were assumed
that humans lack free will, they could not "choose" to commit crimes
and so would be morally blameless for their conduct. Condemnation,
and therefore punishment, would be unjust, given present theoretical
premises. " But without punishment society would be left in what is
believed to be an untenable position. It would need to accept either
crime without societal redress, or the "brutal" notion that incarceration is permissible on the purely utilitarian basis that the evil of
incarcerating morally blameless people is less than the evil of crime
in the streets." Thus, whether free will is a truism or a legal fiction,
it is thought to be a necessary one. 4
As noted earlier,55 Delgado's doctrinal argument is predicated on
the unique theory of a superimposed56 mens rea. Because the mental
49. H.L.A. Hart, supra note 40, at 101-02; see O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
50 (1881).
50. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 780 (1973); M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 45, at 158.
51. There is some support for the determinist position in certain psychological
theories. Classical Freudian theory, for example, posits that conscious acts are an
expression of subconscious drives, resulting from the interplay of the "id," "ego," and
"super-ego." The theory asserts that these subconscious structures are formed early
in human development. It can be argued, therefore, that later conduct is influenced
by events occurring in infancy and childhood, over which the individual has little
control, and for which he should bear no responsibility. See J. MEERLOO, RAPE OF THE
MInD 73 (1956); Hospers, What Means This Freedom? in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM,
supra note 40, at 126. But cf. note 79 infra (alternate formulations of psychological

theory).
52. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1241 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 780 (1973). See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
53. See Branden, Free Will, Moral Responsibility and The Law, 42 S. CAL. L.
Rxv. 264, 265 (1969). See also note 30 supra.

54. H. PACKER, supra note 28, at 74-75, 132; Silverman, Determinism, Choice,
Responsibility and The Psychologist's Role as Expert Witness, 24 Am.PSYCHOLOGIST
5, 6 (1969); see United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 272 (1978) (citing Blocker v.
United States, 288 F.2d 853 (1961) which states at 865 "We must proceed ...on the
scientifically unprovable assumption [of free will]."). See generally Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937).
55. See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text.

56. Delgado's use of "transferred," a term of art in tort and criminal law, to
explain his thesis is unfortunate. In tort law, "transferred intent" means that the
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state of the coercively persuaded victim is inculcated by another
person, Delgado would create a new legal fiction by treating the
actor's mens rea as legally noncognizable. Legal blame would attach
solely to the indoctrinator."
Such a proposal is doctrinally untenable. All ideas and intents
originate outside the individual, in the sense that they are shaped by
experiences and environment.58 As we have seen, however, the law
nevertheless considers intent to be personal-to be a product of each
individual's free will.5 This is true whether the intent to commit the
crime is initiated by an inanimate object ("I saw the painting and it
made me think of killing"), an innocent third party ("X told me the
victim had a lot of money so I killed the victim"), or a guilty third
party." If this were not the case, one could plausibly argue that all
mental states-for example, criminal intentions, or political or religious views-are inauthentic, thus unacceptably blurring concepts
of moral and legal responsibility.
Coercive persuasion obviously falls within the category of intentions originating with a guilty third person. To say that no legally
actor's intent to commit one tortious act (e.g., assault) is "transferred" to the tort
actually committed (e.g., battery), or that intent to commit a tort on one person is
"transferred" to the actual, and different, victim. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ToRTS § 8, at 32-33 (4th ed. 1971). So understood, "transferred intent" is a
concept "that has no proper place in criminal law." R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL
LAw 822-23 (2d ed. 1969).
Delgado uses the term "transferred" in a different sense: that the intent of the
actor is transferred from the apparent perpetrator to some other person-the one who
"gave" him the intent. The doctrine is better viewed, then, as "superimposed" mens
rea.
57.

See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.

In his article, Delgado notes "analogous" contexts in which criminal defendants
are exculpated on a "transferred intent or design" basis. Delgado, supra note 14, at
13-19. One such "analogy" is entrapment. Delgado points out that the prevailing test
for this defense is that a person is acquitted when "the criminal design originates with
...
the Government [agents], and they implant in the mind of an innocent person
the disposition to commit the alleged offense ....

"

Id. at 15 (quoting Sorrells v.

United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).
The true rationale of the entrapment defense is not superimposed mens rea, however, but a public policy that certain government conduct should not be countenanced.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring). This is
made evident by the fact that the same "entrapment" by a private person of another
private person would not serve as a defense. A similar policy serves to explain the
confession cases Delgado cites.
Another of Delgado's "analogies," the hypnosis "defense," is discussed at notes
89-96 infra and accompanying text.
58.

See D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, in II EssAys:

MORAL, POLrrCAL, AND LrTERRY 2, 13-17 (T. Green & T. Grose eds. 1898).
59. See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
60. See note 12 supra and accompanying text; note 107 infra.
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cognizable mens rea is present in the perpetrator in such cases conflicts with current, and sensible, law. Consider this hypothetical situation: A solicits B to steal X's car. B agrees and steals the car. The
idea of theft originated wholly in A's mind. It was "implanted" into
B's mind verbally, with the help, possibly, of an offer of money. A,
of course, is guilty of theft, as a solicitor,' but B is also guilty because,
regardless of where the intent originated, it became his when he accepted it as his. His reason for stealing the car, whether for profit,
fun, or jealousy, or because he is suggestible, does not, in itself,
negate the existence of mens rea.63 The criminal law has no aversion
to convicting more than one person for a single crime, although one
may be considered the originator of the design and another the follower. Delgado's suggestion that the criminal law insists that "any
requisite mental state be found to be that of the defendant himself' 6
is based on the irrelevant rule that vicarious liability is generally
inapplicable to crimes malum in se.65 The law does not impose punishment unless the guilt-here, mens rea-is personal. 6 That view
precludes guilt by agency, but not guilt where personal mens rea is
7
present, as it is here.
61. See State v. Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 101-02, 50 A.2d 152, 154-55 (1946); M.
BAssIoUNI, supra note 44, at 224-25; W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 45, § 58, at
414.
62. Suggestibility, if the result of an abnormal mental condition, could, if severe
enough, negate the requisite mens rea of a crime under the principle of diminished
capacity in some jurisdictions. See People v. McDowell, 69 Cal. 2d 737, 738-39, 447
P.2d 97, 98, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1968). Although logic does not require it, see A.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INsANIY DEFENSE 200 (1967); W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 45, §
42, at 331, this "defense" ordinarily applies only to specific intent crimes, see People
v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 346-47, 202 P.2d 53, 63 (1949), and because the defendant is
found partially responsible, conviction of a lesser crime usually occurs. See W. LAFAvE
& A. Scorr, supra note 45, § 42, at 326.
63. See Hegeman v. Corrigan, 195 N.Y. 1, 12-13, 87 N.E. 792, 796 (1909); M.
BAssIouNI, supra note 45, at 170-71; G. FL-rcHER, supra note 46, § 6.5.5, at 452.
64. Delgado, supra note 14, at 17.
65. See Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 585, 155 A.2d 825, 830, cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1959).
66. See notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text. See generally W. LAFAvE &
A. Scor, supra note 45, § 32, at 224 & n.2.
67. B could show that he lacked the specific mens rea in this case if he could
prove that he had hoped A would be arrested and the property returned. See Wilson
v. People, 103 Colo. 441, 87 P.2d 5 (1939) (defendant who aided another to take
property after he had called police not guilty of larceny). Acquittal would not occur
because B's mental state was inauthentic, however, but because the specific mental
state was not present in any form. B might be guilty, however, of some form of criminal
trespass to personal property.
The only other instance in which B might be acquitted on the basis of a lack of
mens rea is when A uses B as an innocent instrument or dupe. For example, A could
ask B to pick up A's car at X's house. In fact, the car belongs to X, but B does not
know this. If B takes the car, he is innocent of theft, not because of an "implanted"
mens rea but because of no intent to deprive X of his car (since B does not know it is
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It can be argued, however, that this hypothetical situation does
a disservice to Delgado, because he is concerned only with cases in
which intention is transplanted forcefully. But the particular means
through which intent is transferred is irrelevant; so long as the actor
remains free to choose his course of action, he is responsible for his
blameworthy acts. Of course, if it can be said that B has little choice
but to steal the car-where, for example, A holds a gun to B's head
and orders the theft-B would be exulpated on grounds of duress.'
Duress as a defense, however, is not predicated on the theory of the
negation or nonrecognition of a personal mens rea,"9 but rather on the
basis that despite mens rea, the defendant is morally blameless"
because he committed a relatively minor crime 7' under circumstances
X's). See generally J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRMINAL LAw 360-414 (2d ed.
1960); W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 45, § 47, at 356-60 (discussion of ignorance
or mistake).
68. Commission of a crime as a result of an imminent threat of death or great
bodily harm to the actor, or perhaps the actor's family, is excused under the doctrine
of duress. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 407 (6th Cir. 1975); Browning v. State, 31 Ala. App. 137, 140-41, 13 So. 2d 54, 56-57 (1943); Moore v. State, 23
Ala. App. 432, 433, 127 So. 796, 797 (1929) (dictum), cert. denied, 221 Ala. 50, 127 So.
797 (1930); Koontz v. State, 204 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. App. 1967); State v. Clay, 220
Iowa 1191, 1201-03, 264 N.W. 77, 83 (1935) (dictum); Nail v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky.
700, 702, 271 S.W. 1059, 1059-60 (1925); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 442-44, 378 A.2d
755, 765-66 (1977); State v. Patterson, 117 Or. 153, 155-57, 241 P. 977, 978 (1926).
Generally, an exception to the defense is that murder may not be excused even by
threat of death. See generally Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653,
697 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale, dissenting); G. FLrcNER, supranote 46, § 10.4.2, at 82933; W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 45, § 49, at 374-79 & n.36.
69. See, e.g., Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653, 692 (Lord
Simon of Glaisdale, dissenting) ("In the circumstance where . . . duress is relevant,
there are both actus reus and mens rea . . . . [Tihe consequence of the act is intended. .. ").
70. See id. at 696 ("An infraction . . . under duress does not involve that the
conduct is either involuntary or unintentional. . . . But [the actor's] responsibility
is diminished. .... ").
71. Because homicide is generally not excused, see note 68 supra, duress, like
necessity, involves commission of a lesser crime. Some scholars assert that the only
distinction between necessity and duress is that in the former the source of compulsion
is a natural force whereas in the latter, it is human agency. See M. BASsIoUNI, supra
note 45, at 454; W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 45, § 50, at 381. This ignores the
fact, however, that necessity is a justification and duress an excuse. The "victim" of
acts performed with justification is expected not to resist, and others may properly
assist the justified actor in commission of the "crime." This is clearly not the case with
duress. See G. FLurcHER, supra note 46, § 10.4.2., at 830. See generally Gardner, The
Defense of Necessity and The Right to Escapefrom Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 110, 123-39 (1975). It is more
appropriate to explain duress as a situation in which the actor is morally blameless
because the threat was one that a person of ordinary firmness would have not resisted.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1),(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); M. BAssioum,
supra note 45, at 452-53; G. FLzrCHER, supra note 46, § 10.4.2, at 831; Fletcher, The
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involving severely limited and unacceptable choices.2
The error in Delgado's mens rea analysis becomes clearer if one
carefully analyzes a hypothetical situation posited in his article. Delgado notes the existence of "stimoceivers," devices that may be used
to apply electrical currents to a person's brain, causing him to feel
particular emotions.13 Delgado hypothesizes a case in which an evil
third person triggers such a device by remote control, causing the
actor to feel "inexplicably and overwhelmingly angry."74 The actor
"might discharge the aggressive impulse by attacking a hapless bystander."7 5 Delgado then states that in a prosecution of the actor for
assault, acquittal is proper because "[i]f the defendant possessed
mens rea at all, it seems more natural to attribute it, not to the
[defendant], but to the [impulse] sender. . .. "I'
The difficulty with Delgado's mens rea analysis is that the actor
does possess the requisite mental state: intent to batter the hapless
victim. Although his anger is inauthentic, like fear in duress, in that
it originates from external forces, the decision on how to release the
anger is personal, as is the decision on how to alleviate fear. The
defendant could have vented his anger in many noncriminal ways: by
throwing an object at the wall of his house, screaming, or running
around the block. Instead, he exercised an independent and personal
choice when he elected to hit the hapless bystander. The mens rea
necessary to prove the prima facie case for battery is thus present,77
even in Delgado's bizarre example."
Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 293
(1975).
72. See, e.g., Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653, 692 (Lord
Simon of Glaisdale, dissenting) ("[T]here is power of choice between two alternatives;
but one of those alternatives is so disagreeable that ... infraction of the criminal law
seems preferable."); Regina v. Hudson [1971] 2 All E.R. 244, 246 (Crim. App.)
("[Tihe will of the accused [was] overborne by threats of death . . .so that the
commission ... was no longer the voluntary act of the accused."). See also State v.
St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 28 (Mo. 1953); M. BASsioum, supra note 45, at 452-53; H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 14 (1968).
73. Delgado, supra note 14, at 11-12.
74. Id. at 12.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. This is not to suggest, of course, that a defendant, including this one, is guilty
of a crime merely because the mens rea is present. An excuse or justification for the
actor's behavior may be found to acquit the defendant. But one cannot under current
doctrine suggest that there is no cognizable mens rea merely because it is triggered by
an inauthentic force.
78. Delgado's hypothetical is comparable to the case in which a person is born
with, or acquires early in infancy, characteristics of short-temperedness. It may be
argued that his innate temper is not his fault, but his choice to kill when angry is
ordinarily neither excused nor mitigated. See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 56, at
56 (reasonable man standard applies); Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law
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Mens rea is not absent in cases of coercive persuasion. Although
theories of the etiology of coercive persuasion abound, all are premised on the view that the captive comes to share the captor's view,
and later commits supportive crimes, because he wants-that is, intends-to commit the acts. The intent itself may derive from any one
of various psychological sources79 but the mens rea is clearly present.
of Homicide I, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 1261, 1281-1282 (1937) (provocation measured by
effect on most men, not individual). With an appropriate factual change in the stimoceiver hypothetical, the defendant might be acquitted. If, for example, the stimoceiver
triggers an involuntary movement of the arms, and the bystander is in the way when
the arms flail, the defendant is clearly innocent because his conduct is involuntary, in
the nature of a reflex. See notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text.
79. Several early writers used Pavlovian classical conditioning principles to explain coercive persuasion used during the Korean War by the Chinese Communists.
Pavlovian learning theory, also referred to as classical conditioning, proposes that
when a neutral stimulus (e.g., a bell) is paired with an "unconditioned" stimulus (e.g.,
food) that causes an innate automatic response (e.g., salivation), the neutral stimulus
eventually evokes the automatic response even when the unconditioned stimulus is not
presented. See D. SCHULTZ, A HISTORY OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 160-63 (1973). Pavlov's
theory, however, can account for only very limited aspects of coercive persuasion. See
E. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 16-17. Consequently, although some writers have attempted
to expand Pavlovian principles to encompass the entire process of coercive persuasion,
see, e.g., J. MEERLOO, supra note 51, at 39; W. SARGANT, BArS FOR THE MIND 227
(1957), they have often gone so far beyond the experimental findings of Pavlov that
their theories are in disrepute. See E. SCHEIN, supra note 1 at 200-04.
Other psychologists have advanced theories that, although based on Pavlovian
principles, are not so extreme. One such view combines Pavlovian classical conditioning theory with drive reduction or instrumental conditioning principles. See, e.g.,
Farber, Harlow & West, Brainwashing, Conditioning, and DDD (Debility, Dependency, and Dread), 20 SOCIOMETRY 271 (1957); Santucci & Winokur, Brainwashingas a
Factor in Psychiatric Illness, 74 A.M.A. ARCnvs NEUROLOGY & PSYCH. 11, 15-16
(1955). The drive reduction theory states that external or internal stimuli trigger innate
or learned drives that in turn trigger behavior intended to reduce or eliminate such
drives. See J. DOLLARD &N. MILLER, PERSONALrrY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 28-47 (1950). For
example, an internal stimulus, such as lack of food, will trigger an innate drive to
behave in a way that will alleviate the hunger-drive. Adherents of this classical-drive
reduction hybrid school assert that when captors employ physical threats to coerce
behavior counter to the captive's beliefs, the captive experiences anxiety and guilt
feelings. These feelings create a "drive state" in which the captive seeks to reduce hia
anxiety and guilt. As time passes, classical conditioning operates to induce anxiety in
the prisoner by a variety of simple cues rather than direct threats from his captors.
Other than directly confronting his captors, the only means the prisoner has to reduce
his anxiety and guilt is to adopt their beliefs and values. See Santucci & Winokur,
supra, at 15-16.
Another theory, which resembles Pavlovian learning theory in its emphasis on the
prisoner's physiological state, is premised on "psycho-physiological stress." See Hinkle
& Wolff, The Methods of Interrogationand IndoctrinationUsed By The Communist
State Police, 33 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 600 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Hinkle &
Wolff I]; Hinkle & Wolff, Communist Interrogation and Indoctrinationof "Enemies
of the State," 76 A.M.A. ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY & PSYCH. 115 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Hinkle & Wolff II]. Its proponents theorize that various psychological and physiol-
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ogical stresses due to sleep deprivation, harsh prison conditions, and isolation produce
disease, malnutrition, mental dullness, depression, and delirium. It is in this state that
the prisoner undergoes interrogation. The prisoner, "undergoing an ordeal which is
profoundly unpleasant and apparently endless, is highly motivated to seek some end
to his misery. . . .[And hfe is vulnerable to rationalizations and contrived definitions that allow him to make an ostensible confession. . . ." Hinkle & Wolff I, supra,
at 607-08. In short, this theory postulates that because the prisoner is in a state of
mental and physical exhaustion, his capacity to evaluate decreases, and his desire "to
make whatever adjustments in relation to his environment which are necessary increases." Hinkle & Wolff II, supra at 170. Empirical support for this theory is, however,
insubstantial. See E. ScHNm, supra note 1, at 204-05.
Coercive persuasion has also been explained in traditional psychoanalytic or
Freudian terms. See Moloney, Psychic Self-abandon and Extortion of Confession, 36
INTERNAL J. PSYCHO-ANALYsIs 53 (1955). According to traditional psychoanalytic
theory, the personality is a three-part structure: id, ego, and superego. The id, the
mental province containing everything inherited, seeks to satisfy instinctual (e.g. hunger, thirst, sex) desires. The ego, an outgrowth of the id, is in direct contact with the
external world. Its function is to delay the id's desire for immediate discharge of
tension until the appropriate object and environmental conditions are present. Thus,
the ego regulates the id with reference to reality. The superego is that component of
the personality that internalizes parental or societal standards. Its primary functions
are "(1) to inhibit the. . . id. . ., (2) to persuade the ego to substitute moralistic goals
for realistic ones, [i.e. be the conscience], and (3) to strive for perfection." C. HALL &
G. LINDzEY, THEORmS OF PERSONALrTY 32-35 (2d ed. 1970). Using these psychoanalytic
principles Moloney suggests that during great stress a person with a strong superego
will convert to the captor's beliefs because the ego is no longer able to direct him
toward the reason and sanity of the real world. By obeying the captor's orders, the
individual "merely acced[es] to the only authority which any longer seem[s] real to
him, a parasitic superego." Moloney, supra at 58. In short, the authority of his captors
serves as the stern father who was so instrumental in developing his strong superego,
thereby causing the prisoner to pursue his captor's beliefs as his moralistic goals.
Lifton has presented a second psychoanalytic theory of coercive persuasion. R.
LwroN, supra note 1, at 65-85. Because he has integrated sociological principles into
his theory, his approach is much broader than the traditional Freudian analysis. Lifton
argues that the "thought reform" process begins with emotional assaults on the individual. These assaults create a guilt anxiety that causes the individual to feel in total
conflict with the external environment. Contrasting sharply with these periods of assault are periods in which the captors show extreme kindness to the prisoner. This
kindness gives the prisoner hope that if he changes his anxiety will end. The captors'
constant demand for confession also assumes a powerful role in the thought reform
process. "Such demands are made possible not only by the ubiquitous human tendencies toward guilt and shame but also by the need to give expression to these tendencies. . . .Confession becomes a means of exploiting. . . these vulnerabilities." Id. at
425. Thus, confession initially brings satisfaction by providing an opportunity for
"emotional catharsis and for relief of suppressed guilt feelings." Id. at 426. When the
captors continue to demand confession, however, the captive finds it impossible to
strike a balance between worth and humility. In the next stage, the captors broaden
the prisoner's guilt so that he views not only his past acts, but also his past identity,
as evil. By placing the prisoner in such an anxiety state, the captors begin a process
of re-education in which the prisoner adopts the captors' beliefs and loyalties as part
of a new identity.
Socio-psychological theories assert that Chinese coercive persuasion operated by
intentionally weakening prisoner of war group social structures and casting doubt on
each person's professional and personal identity. E. SCmEm, supra note 1, at 221-33.
Thus, the prisoner sought a new identity for which he could obtain social approval.
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One cannot do as Delgado suggests: pretend it is not there. If the law
creates such a fiction in some cases by ignoring the intent of the actor
because of dismay over the way he came to have it, there is no logical
reason to limit such inquiry. Delgado's mens rea thesis, therefore,
violates his own goal of logically but minimally extending the law.
His concept would constitute an abrupt, unprecedented, and potentially unlimitable change in legal doctrine. 0
2.

Actus Reus

The second component of criminal responsibility-actus
reus-may also be looked to for guidance in determining what society
considers to be blameworthy conduct. Although mental choice is, as
a philosophical matter, conclusively presumed, the law does not presume bodily choice. To be punishable, social harm must be the result
of a voluntary act, a voluntary movement of a muscle in the body.8'
Because the captors monopolized the prison conditions, they made it probable that the
prisoner would find such an identity in the "new man" modeled by the captors.
Another theory that provides a possible explanation for coercive persuasion is that
of operant conditioning. Skinner, its major proponent, believes that all human behavior is controlled by positive and negative reinforcements. B. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1953). Reinforcement following a response increases the probability
of that response occurring in the future. Behavior changes as the individual attempts
to obtain the reward that he receives when he shifts to the new behavior. It would seem
that because a captor controls all external rewards, he could use operant conditioning
to make his captive behave as he wishes. One author has suggested that whereas bodily
functions and emotions may be manipulated by Pavlovian classical conditioning, new
ideas and attitudes are more a result of "instrumental" or operant conditioning. See

P. LONDON,

BEHAVIOR CONTROL

85-94 (1969). See also E. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 209.

The theory of "cognitive dissonance" may also explain coercive persuasion. See
generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNiTvE DISSONANCE (1957). This theory assumes that whenever an individual simultaneously holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, or opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent, dissonance occurs.
When dissonance is present, an individual is motivated to behave in a way calculated
to restore consonance. The most common dissonant situation is when an individual
performs an act inconsistent with his beliefs or values. One successful means of reducing dissonance is to alter one's personal beliefs to conform with one's public behavior.
According to this theory, a prisoner's confession would be a dissonant act and a subsequent attitude change in favor of the ideals of his captors would be the act restoring
consonance. See E. SCHEIN, supra note 1, at 241-44.
A final view, proposed by Schein, is that during the process of captivity, prisoners
seek methods of understanding their unpleasant conditions. Id. at 233-36. As a consequence they are receptive to information they ordinarily would reject. Gradually, they
acquire a "genuine understanding" of why their captors believe they are guilty of moral
crimes. Id. at 236. Realizing also that their preconceived expectations of severe torture
at captors' hands did not generally occur, they are more willing to evaluate matters in
a fashion more favorable to their captors' viewpoints.
80. See notes 125-136 infra and accompanying text.
81. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 49, at 54-55; W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note
45, § 25, at 179-80.
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Although all people can choose, that does not mean that on a particular occasion a person did choose.
It is critical to understand, however, that the term "voluntary,"
as applied to movements of the body, does not mean that the actor
must consciously desire or even be aware that he has willed a movement of a particular muscle.12 It is enough that it results from an
order of the cortex in the brain." What is actually implicated by the
concept of involuntariness is the idea that the conduct is inappropriate-that is, conduct not required to do that which the actor believes himself to be doing." Thus, reflexive and unconscious acts are
involuntary." Conduct controlled by the subconscious, however, is
treated as voluntary. 8 The requirement of a voluntary act, like the
requirement of mens rea, serves to prevent punishment where the
actor had no control over his actions and, therefore, exercised no
choice.
All theories of coercive persuasion support the view that the
conduct of a coercively persuaded actor is voluntary as so defined."
No theory suggests that the conduct is either reflexive or committed
while unconscious. Rather, the behavior results from orders of the
brain and is entirely appropriate; the act is required to do that which
the actor believes he is doing.
Although Delgado expressly concedes that coercively persuaded
individuals act voluntarily, 8 he suggests that coercive persuasion is
analogous to hypnotism.8 ' He notes that the Model Penal Code" and
one state, California," recognize hypnotism as a valid defense premised on involuntariness. There is good reason why such a defense is
accepted by so few jurisdictions. Although scientific understanding
82. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 72, at 101-02; M. HYDE, BRAINWASHING AND
OTHER FORMS OF MIND CONTROL 97-98 (1977).
83. M. BASSiOUNI, supra note 45, at 164; see M. HYDE, supra note 82, at 12.
84. H.L.A. HART, supra note 72, at 105.
85. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.
1960) (unconsciousness); People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970)
(unconsciousness); People v. Grant, 46 111. App. 3d 125, 360 N.E.2d 809 (1977) (epileptic seizures); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (reflex, unconsciousness).
86. The concept of the subconscious is comparatively new. The law of the "act"
precedes it by centuries. However, under the current meaning of the term "act," see
notes 81-85 supra and accompanying text, such conduct is not "involuntary." It is
appropriate conduct. Likewise, it is voluntary in a physiological sense. See M.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 45, at 165.
87. See note 79 supra.
88. Delgado, supra note 14, at 11.
89. Id. at 13.
90. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2), Comment at 122 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
91. People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App. 2d 284, 338 P.2d 495 (1959) (trial judge's
instruction on hypnosis defense upheld).
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of hypnosis is greater than that of coercive persuasion, it is still seriously incomplete. In 1961, experts were found to be undecided on the
extent to which people could be convinced by hypnosis to commit
criminal acts.'2 A recent survey of 215 scientific studies indicated that
although some "enhancement of hypnotic-like behavior as a consequence of induction" may exist, such enhancement is minimal, and
"this is the least resolved of the [various] issues."' 3 This survey
supports the belief that personal traits are much more important
than hypnotic induction in making one suggestible.
As a result, it is difficult to distinguish hypnosis cases from
countless other examples of suggestiveness: A yawns, B follows; likewise, some people simply follow other people's leads, almost unthinkingly, because of friendship or other psychological or sociological
dynamics. 5 In such cases, either we say that choice is present-one
chooses to follow, or chooses not to think for oneseW'-or we admit
that due to personal or sociological factors beyond the person's control, many or all people are so suggestible as to lack real free will.
This, however, is a determinist argument, and is therefore antithetical to current legal values. The coercive persuasion-hypnosis analogy,
then, does not serve as a logical extension of the law, but as an
abrupt, unlimited change.
3. Excuses
The final societal standards of blameworthiness against which
Delgado's coercive persuasion defense may be measured are the currently recognized excuses of insanity and duress. As with the mens
rea and actus reus requirements, these excuses condition criminal
responsibility on the presence or absence of meaningful choice. Insanity involves an internal circumstance-disease of the mind-that
substantially or totally impairs the actor's cognitive capability. He
must either be unaware of what he has done, or unaware of the wrongfulness of his conduct;" alternatively, the disease must substantially
92. Swain, Hypotism and the Law, 14 VAND. L. Rzv. 1509, 1511 (1961).
93. Hilgard, Hypnosis, 26 ANN.REv. PsYcH. 19, 20-21 (1975).
94. Id. at 20.
95. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St. 2d 127, 357 N.E.2d 1059 (1976) (defendant easily influenced; came under control of another).
96. "There was nothing to prevent [the ghetto child] ... from thinking, except
that he did not feel like it .... Man's free will consists of a single action, a single basic
choice to think or not to think." Branden, supra note 53, at 280-81.
97. This is the M'Naghten test of insanity. Under this test, the defendant is

excused if it is
clearly proved that ... the party accused was labouring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality

of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.
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impair his volitional capabilities, so that he cannot effectively control
his conduct."8 Under these circumstances, talk of choice is meaningless. A person has no choice when disease causes him to lose all touch
with reality or to be unable to conform to reality." Thus, blameworthiness is absent when insanity is proven.
Duress involves an external circumstance-an imminent threat
of death or great bodily harm to the individual or a family member-that severely limits the actor's choice.' Choice is greater in a
case of duress than in a case of insanity, because the actor comprehends the alternatives and has the ability to not respond illegally.
Nonetheless, practical choice is eliminated by the deadly threat."'
Again, the actor is blameless."'
The case for exculpating the coercively persuaded defendant in
the manner suggested by Delgado is far less compelling. First, he goes
so far as to permit the defense not only in cases in which the person
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). This test is
currently applied in eighteen states. See State v. Smith, 223 Kan. 203, 217, 574 P.2d
548, 557 (1977) (list of states cited).
98. This is the so-called "irresistible impulse" or "control" test, which is used
only in conjunction with the M'Naghten test. See note 97 supra. First applied in
Alabama in Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887), this test judges a person to be
insane if he satisfies the M'Naghten test or "if, by reason of the duress of such mental
disease, [the actor has] so far lost the power to choose between the right and wrong,
. . . as that his free agency was at the time destroyed. . . ." Id. at 866. Five states
have adopted this combined test. See State v. Smith, 223 Kan. 203, 217, 574 P.2d 548,
557 (1977) (list of states cited). In addition, 26 states and' all but one federal circuit
have adopted the American Law Institute (ALI) test, a modernized version of the
combined M'Naghten and control test. See id. at 557; A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at
87. Virtually all jurisdictions in the United States, therefore, apply an insanity test
based on M'Naghten or the control theories.
99. See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957); H. PACKER,
supra note 28, at 132 ("We must put up with the bother of the insanity defense because
to exclude it is to deprive the criminal law of its chief paradigm of free will."). The
irresistible impulse test, see note 98 supra, obviously is based on a lack of choice.
Thirty-one states apply either the irresistible impulse or ALI test in which negation of
volition is included as an element. See id. Even the pure M'Naghten test involves an
element of lessened self-control, because the person lacks awareness of the criminality
of his conduct. See A. GOLDSTEiN, supra note 62, at 45. Moreover, courts have at times
permitted explicit evidence of an actor's lack of self-control in a M'Naghten jurisdiction because such evidence may generate reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors
regarding the M'Naghten elements. See id. at 54.55.
100. See note 68 supra.
101. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
102. Where the actor is ordered to murder another, the defense is inapplicable,
see note 68 supra, although the degree of choice is equally limited, because society
believes that a person "ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent." Director of
Pub. Prosecutions v. Lynch [1975] A.C. 653, 672 (Lord Morris of Borthy-y-Gest,

quoting 1 M.

HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN

51 (London 1678)). In such circumstances, a

person is thought to be morally blameworthy for succumbing to the threat.
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is indoctrinated to commit crimes but also in cases in which the
defendant is the victim solely of attitudinal indoctrination and is free
to choose the means by which to further his new ideology.0 3 As a
result, Delgado would exculpate obviously morally blameworthy persons.
This is demonstrated by consideration of a few hypothetical situations: D, a chronic polluter, involuntarily taught the virtue of ecology by X, is transformed into an ecologist. Released from the captive
situation, D decides that the best way to promote his new creed is to
kill human beings, because they pollute the waters and the lands.
Proud of his new faith, aware of the wrongfulness of his conduct, D
commits mass murder. Under Delgado's definition of the test,' " and
pursuant to his earlier stated unprovable premise,"'5 D would be acquitted because he is blameless. Such a result cannot be defended in
light of current jurisprudential thought. The fact that D's views are
causally connected to the indoctrination is as legally irrelevant as the
fact that parental influence on D may have caused him to initially
become a polluter, thus making him a target of X's indoctrination.
All that matters under our current criminal justice system is that D
voluntarily chose to act in a way he knew was immoral and illegal.'"
The requisite blameworthiness is present. 07
Consider also a situation in which D is indoctrinated forcefully
by X to believe that homosexuality is sinful, that homosexuals are
not only immoral but are constant proselytizers of their "sexual sin,"
and that if allowed to do so, they tend to convert people to their
immoral beliefs. D then murders every homosexual he meets. D's
counter-indoctrination of homosexuals might have been predicted as
a result of his indoctrination by X, but murder would not be a reasonably foreseeable outcome. The decision to commit the crime was
again solely that of D. Would Delgado suggest that D be acquitted? 8
His proposed defense says yes; society would, the author trusts, say
no.
The only way, then, in which Delgado's defense could be framed
so as to avoid exculpating morally blameworthy actors is if it applies
only to cases involving crime indoctrination, for example, where D is
103. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
104. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
107. Furthermore, there is no way to punish X for the mass murders because X
did not solicit the crimes. Although he aided in their commission in a causal fashion,
guilt by complicity is only possible if he intended the crime to occur. See W. LAFA E
& A. Scorr, supra note 45, § 64, at 502. Nor can he be treated as the perpetrator,
because D is not an innocent dupe. See note 67 supra.
108. Here, too, X would not be guilty of the murders. See note 107 supra.
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specifically indoctrinated to kill the polluters or homosexuals.'" Even
so narrowed, the case for those coercively persuaded to commit
crimes is less compelling than for those entitled to current excuses.
Compared to the insane individual, the coercively persuaded actor's
choices are far more substantial, and hence his blameworthiness commensurately greater. Since, as Delgado concedes, the coercively persuaded actor is aware of the wrongfulness of his action,"10 choice is
cognitively present. Delgado does not suggest that the actor is volitionally incapable of conforming his conduct to the law."'
The case for the coercively persuaded defendant is also weaker
than that of one acting under duress. A loaded and cocked gun
pressed to one's head presents more substantial loss of choice, and a
clearer example of blamelessness, than do the conditions undergone
by religious cultists or Patricia Hearst. In the latter type of case, the
person may experience a harsh environment, and thus have limited
choice, but the residual options cannot be equated to the alternatives
available to an actor under threat of immediate death.
B.

ADEQUATE LIMITATIONS

Even if Delgado could show that some coercively persuaded actors should be considered blameless, his defense would still be open
to challenge on the ground that it does not impose clear and just
limitations on the excuse's applicability. This failure forces society
to choose between two alternatives, both of which are antithetical to
current concepts of criminal responsibility. It must either allow some
morally blameworthy actors to be excused, while not excusing some
morally blameless actors, or accept a theory of criminal responsibility
that embraces a determinist view of society.
Existing excuses are framed in a narrow and a relatively clear
fashion so as to enable the trier of fact to make an uncomplicated
moral judgment. For example, limitations to the duress defense have
the effect of making the moral issue comparatively clear: The require109. Proof of crime indoctrination would be more difficult to obtain than of
ideology indoctrination. Was Patricia Heart indoctrinated to commit bank robbery, for
example, or was she only ideologically indoctrinated, then told she was free to leave,
whereupon she voluntarily chose to stay with her captors-turned-comrades and participate in discussion of the bank robbery? Or, is a "religious convert . . .soliciting
donations for nonexisting social programs," Delgado, supra note 14, at 5, because of
crime indoctrination or ideological indoctrination? The line between crime indoctrination and crimes committed because of ideology indoctrination, clear in theoretical
terms, is irremediably blurred in evidentiary terms.
110. Delgado, supra note 14, at 11.
111. Delgado does state that thought reform may impair behavior controls. Id.
at 6 n.29. To be on equal footing with insanity, however, resulting impairment must
be total or substantial.
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ment of imminency ensures that the danger is real.12 The requirement that the threat be to oneself or to relatives and not to strangers,
and that it be one of lethal or great bodily harm rather than to
reputation,"' serve to make the threat more easily quantifiable, more
tangible, so that jurors can easily evaluate the facts and make the
necessary moral judgments. A jury can understand the gun to the
head. Each juror can decide whether such a threat would be sufficient
to coerce commission of a crime. The insanity defense is admittedly
more amorphous, but it does require a disease of the mind: some
condition sufficiently clear and defined that an expert can describe
it and its effects with relative particularity."' The test is narrow in
order to ensure that the defense will not succeed unless it is accompanied by visible and gross symptoms." 5 Present excuses, then, have an
abruptness to them. Rather than consider degrees of disease or differing degrees of threat, the law has allowed only those defenses that fall
within specific, reasonably identifiable categories in which choice is
obviously substantially limited.
This necessary clarity is absent in the coercive persuasion defense Delgado proposes. He cannot, himself, state its essential elements. Instead, he lists factors that, when most are present, indicate
that the defense is appropriate."' In contrast to the exactitude of the
duress and insanity tests, his test is imprecise. How a jury should
apply the defense is unclear. Is each factor equally important? Can
a factor be partially present? For example, how can a jury decide if
a defendant's mental state "represents a sharp departure from
112. See note 68 supra; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-906 (1977) (requirement of
"imminent death or great bodily harm"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3209 (1974) (same);
MINN. STAT. § 609.08 (1976) ("instant" death).
113. See note 68 supra.
114. The law is unclear regarding what diseases qualify. See G. FLErcHER, supra
note 46, § 10.4.4, at 839-43. Mental illnesses other than those labeled "psychoses" are
rarely interposed as a defense. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at 33. Other diseases,
however, including neuroses, also qualify. H. WEIHoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 119 (1954). It appears that if a psychiatrist can pigeonhole the actor's
symptoms in a named disease, and discuss the parameters of that disease, the issue of
insanity will go to the jury. Id. at 48. See also H. WEmHoFEN, THE URGE To PUNISH 8599 (1956).
115. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1180 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring) ("The criminal law cannot 'vary legal norms with the individual's capacity
to meet the standards they prescribe, absent a disability that is both gross and verifiable, such as the mental disease or defect that may establish irresponsibility.' ")
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comment at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960)), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973); A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 62, at 19, 46, 63 (tests expressly
apply only to those who obviously have "lost touch with reality"; actors exempted only
"if they obviously did not know what they were about," only if there are manifest
"visible and gross" symptoms).
116. See Delgado, supra note 14, at 19.22, discussed at note 31 supra and accompanying text.
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[that] individual's ordinary mode of thinking"?117 Must one begin as
an atheist before becoming a religious cultist, or would a prior affiliation with mainstream Christianity be sufficient? Would previous
adherence to the tenets of a strict fundamentalist sect serve to
disqualify? The defense simply lacks the necessary precision that
society rightly requires of all of its exculpatory provisions."1
More basically, Delgado's factors, even in combination, lack adequate contours. By permitting the defense when there is no disease
of the mind, he takes the defense outside of the convenient medical
model. Similarly, because the threat is more psychological than physical, it is not susceptible to needed measurement. In fact, depending
upon the scientific theory one accepts, it is not altogether clear that
there is any threat with coersive persuasion. It may be that bad
conditions alone cause the indoctrination, that intellectualization
without threats is sufficient to explain it, or that a quasi-Pavlovian
setting results in the actor feeling a threat that is not actually present."' Without a medical model or a quantifiable threat, and in the
face of conflicting scientific theories as to how the process works,
sufficient limits to the defense are absent.
Delgado argues, however, that suitable line drawing is possible
with his defense. He notes that there are certain external manifestations of coercive persuasion that will aid in identifying when it is
appropriate to apply the defense. First, coercively persuaded individuals exhibit dissociation, memory loss, confusion, and the like; second, there will be external evidence of imprisonment, isolation, sensory deprivation, interrogation, physiological depletion, and terror.
The defense can be limited, Delgado claims, to cases involving such
evidence. 1 '
Not even these external manifestations provide assurance that
only blameless actors will be excused, however. One can easily envision a not-so-unlikely hypothetical situation that exemplifies the
problem: A prison inmate is put in solitary confinement in a small
dank, dark cell and fed little or nothing for an extended period of
117. Id. at 20.
118. Cf. Greenwalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 927 (1969).

It would be possible, of course, to permit a general defense that one's will
was overborne, either by internal psychic pressures or by external force or
necessity, and to determine individual cases in light of their special facts.
One might reject such a course, however, on the ground that the application
of the defense would be highly uncertain and would decrease the law's general deterrence by encouraging people to succumb to strong impulses they

would have otherwise resisted.
Id. at 963.
119. See note 79 supra.
120. Delgado, supra note 14, at 26-27.
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time.' Upon his release from solitary confinement, he immediately
comes under the influence of a fellow prisoner who speaks to him
about a prison "religion" calling for the murder of guards. Would
Delgado, or society, permit a coercive persuasion defense if the prisoner kills a guard? Although the factors for the defense arguably are
present, it is unlikely that society would permit the prisoner's acquittal.
If Delgado requires that these external manifestations be present
before applying the defense, his proposal may be criticized for an
entirely different reason. It seems morally unexceptionable that excuses should be framed so that equal cases are treated equally. Indeed, Delgado asserts that a defense should not sacrifice individuals
"for the sake of preserving an artificial conceptual simplicity." 2 2 His
defense, however, is far guiltier of artificial simplicity than is present
law, because it fails to treat morally equal cases equally.
As discussed earlier, duress and insanity are limited to cases of
substantial choice reduction.2n Society excuses the actor when substantial choice reduction is caused by a disease or defect, or by a
lethal threat. No doubt certain mental conditions less substantial
than disease and certain nonlethal threats also cause a diminution,
albeit of lesser degree, of the actor's available choices. Society has
121. This is not an unheard of event. See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519
(2d Cir. 1967) (prisoner kept for 33 days in filthy cell, without adequate heat, nude for
11 days, forced upon threat of violence to stand at military attention, deprived of
sleep); Krist v. Smith, 309 F. Supp. 497, 498 (S.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 439
F.2d 146 (1971) (prisoner confined in nine foot by five foot cell, without sufficient food,
exercise, windows, or company except cockroaches). See generallyComment, Solitary
Confinement-Punishment Within The Letter of The Law, or Psychological Torture?
1972 Wis. L. Rlv. 223. See also Minneapolis Tribune, Sept. 16, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 2
(reporting CIA spokesman's testimony that CIA kept a Soviet defector in a secret vault
camouflaged by a "fake" building for three years, watched him continuously, prevented him from reading or keeping track of time, engaged in "hostile interrogations"
designed to elicit a confession that he was a KGB agent, and considered killing him
or "renderfing] him incapable of telling a coherent story").
Beyond solitary confinement, prisons and jails themselves may serve as the breeding grounds for such crime indoctrination. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318,
322-27 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (overcrowded, filthy, unsanitary, inadequazely heated and
ventilated living quarters; physical abuse by fellow prisoners), aff'd sub nom. Newman
v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3144 (1978); Gates v.
Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881,887-92 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affl'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974)
(physical brutality of guards and fellow prisoners; overcrowded, filthy, unsanitary
isolation cells); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 372-78, 380 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub nom. Hutto v. Finney, 434 U.S. 901
(1977) (No. 76-1660) (same). See also Murray, Ringer & Alarcon, Prison Reform:
Backward or Forward, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 356, 361 (prisons are "disgraceful dungeons
...wholly inadequate places to house human beings ... places of total hopelessness
and despair.").
122. Delgado, supra note 14, at 27.
123. See notes 97-102 supra and accompanying text.
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chosen, however, to limit the excuses to the more severe situations
in the belief that extension to other cases might make the excuses
limitless~lu A line has therefore been drawn: exculpation is permitted
only for "diseases" and "imminent lethal threats" because society
has found that choice is substantially limited in such cases, and not
so in lesser situations. Such line drawing, while somewhat artificial,
is at least fair because it separates the strong cases from the weak.
Delgado replaces this scheme with an artificiality far worse. He
separates potentially equal cases from one another, so that defendants with arguably similar moral claims are treated unequally. He
would excuse a defendant who is the victim of "abnormal influences," such as physical depletion, prolonged isolation, and interrogation, but would deny the defense to a person who presents some of
the same symptoms of choice reduction, but whose symptoms are not
the result of abnormal influences.' Conditions such as life-long poverty, drug addition, a broken home, peer group pressure, and lowered
self-esteem might demonstrate that a ghetto inhabitant's choice in
committing a criminal act was also substantially reduced, yet Delgado's defense would not apply.'
Delgado offers no cogent explanation why one should prefer the
artificial simplicity of his proposal over the present law of excuses.
The morally relevant factor is choice reduction, not exposure to
"abnormal influences." If one draws the line as he does, exculpating
one form of choice reduction and ignoring others, one is obliged to
explain why cases potentially'2 equal'21 on their face receive unequal
treatment.
124. Low I.Q. qualifies as a disease under the insanity test. See, e.g., State v.
Johnson, 233 Wis. 668, 290 N.W. 159 (1940); A. GoDsTmn, supra note 62, at 48; H.
WsmoYEN, INSANmY AS A DzmsziN CiMumAL LAw 94-96 (1933). Sub-psychoses also
qualify. See note 114 supra. Therefore, only comparatively mild abnormalities would
seem to be totally eliminated from consideration. In such cases, the substantial volitional or cognitive disabilities the defense requires are not apt to be present. Furthermore, a "disease" is required because in such cases the actor shifts responsibility to
something else-the disease. A. GoLnsTmN, supra note 62, at 18-19. The actor did not
choose to act as he did; the disease caused his behavior. See note 115 supra.
As to duress, see, for example, State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 434, 378 A.2d 755,
761 (1977) (neither threats of slight injury nor threats of destruction to property coercive enough to overcome a person's will).
125. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
126. Delgado's suggested test would require that the defense be inapplicable
since only a few, if any, of his suggested factors would be present. See id.
127. Admittedly, most "environmental" cases will involve facts less severe than
would cases of coercive persuasion. What is troubling, is that Delgado's defense excludes such a claim in all cases, no matter how compelling.
128. The case for exculpation of the ghetto defendant can at times be even
stronger than for the coercively persuaded defendant, such as a cultist or Hearst. The
conditions under which the ghetto person lives last longer than an episode of tradi-
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Delgado's defense, then, not only exculpates those who are
blameworthy according to current standards and creates a test that
is vague and difficult to apply, it also advocates the drawing of a new,
morally doubtful line between criminal responsibility and blamelessness.'12 There are only two ways to avoid such an unfair result: either
reaffirm current law, which is strict but clear, or enlarge the coercive
persuasion defense to include within its possible reach the full panoply of environmental influences. Such a defense would apply whenever the conditions, not merely threats or abnormal influences, affecting the actor were so great that a person of ordinary firmness 3 ,
in the actor's situation would have committed the crime. With the
adoption of this test, however, determinists virtually win their case.
Abundant scientific evidence demonstrates that the ordinary person
will reject his pre-existing moral values to obey antisocial orders even
under comparatively noncoercive circumstances.' The person of
"ordinary firmness" is not very firm. Likewise, credible evidence
shows that factors external to the actor serve as powerful influences,
if not determinants, in a person's behavior. For example, parents who
batter their children usually were battered in their youth;' 2 children
tional coercive persuasion. Although the intensity is absent, there is no reason why
long-term malnutrition and its effects, constant economic pressures, and peer influences, cannot wear down the average person more certainly than a cult situation.
Moreover, although this involves a moral judgment with which others can disagree, the ethical case for the environmental defense seems stronger than for certain
cases of coercive persuasion. The person born into the ghetto clearly had no choice of
birthplace, and likewise had no choice of living environment during his formative
youth. Although the prisoner of war or kidnap victim had no choice, the cultist initially
chooses to enter the religious organization.
129. Delgado argues that at least in the paradigmatic coercive persuasion cases
most could agree that a defense should be offered, and that potential difficulty in
drawing the line elsewhere should not result in denial of the defense in such clear cases.
Delgado, supra note 14, at 28. If such cases involve threats of less than great bodily
harm, however, the criticisms to the defense described herein are applicable. Ifwhat
makes the cases paradigmatic is that threats of imminent lethal harm are involved,
then duress already serves as an adequate defense.
130. Individual frailties, such as suggestibility, should not relieve the actor of the
duty of fulfilling an objective standard. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 49, at 50. See
also id. at 108 ("[N]o doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of
Heaven . . . .[Blut the courts [on Earth] ...decline to take his personal equation
into account."); H.L.A. Hart, supra note 40, at 104-05.
131. Research by Milgram on obedience has found people willing to administer
apparent shocks of substantial intensity to supposed victims strapped in electric
chairs, upon the order of the experimenter. All subjects administered substantial
shocks, and 62% applied the highest shock levels, which apparently killed or rendered
the victims unconscious. Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL &
Soc. PsycH. 371 (1963).
132. See Ackley, A Brief Overview of ChildAbuse, 58 Soc. CASEwoRK 21 (1977);
Jayratne, Child Abusers as Parentsand Children:A Review, 22 Soc. WoRK 5 (N.Y.
1977).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:335

of alcoholics are significantly more likely to have serious social problems than are those of nonalcoholic parents;11 juvenile prostitutes
often are victims of physical and sexual abuse at home;U some children can be made more susceptible to committing violent acts by the
media;"' and, of course, the bitterness and conditions of ghetto life
are conducive to crime. 3 ' In short, if a defense based on reduced
choice is to be created that treats equal cases equally, it must permit
persons to present their entire life histories as part of a
"blamelessness" defense to crime.
Thus, we face a quandary: either we leave the law as it is, or we
permit a defense which, if applied to all equal cases, would allow
"morally blameless" but possibly dangerous persons back into society. If the latter path is followed, of course, society would have little
choice but to throw away current jurisprudential underpinnings and
incarcerate people on solely utilitarian grounds. Such a result may
appear to some to be logical, even appropriate, but it is certainly
revolutionary. Delgado, and other advocates of a coercive persuasion
defense, should acknowledge that this is the real choice.

133. See Miller & Jang, Children of Alcoholics: A 20-Year Longitudinal Study,
13 Soc. WORK RESEARCH & ABSTRACTS 23, 28 (1977).
134. Sixty-six percent of juvenile prostitutes interviewed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, had been physically abused by parents; 33% sexually abused. Minneapolis Tribune, Aug. 18, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1 (reporting results of study by Minnesota Task Force
on Juvenile Prostitution).
135. See Bandura, D. Ross, & S. Ross, Imitation of Film-MediatedAggressive
Models, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 3 (1963).

136.

See ATLANTA

COMMISSION ON CRIME AND JuvENLE DELINQUENCY, OPPORTUNITY

FOR URBAN EXCELLENCE 24 (1966). See also Carstairs, Overcrowding and Human
Aggression in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 593,

600-01 (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969) (overcrowded, impoverished, urban conditions may cause alienation, bitterness and aggression) (report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence).

